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Construct Stabilization and the Unity
of the Mind-Brain Sciences
Jacqueline Anne Sullivan*y
This article offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that ex-
planations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations
can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration re-
quires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are
stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed
at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as
to promote such stability is put forward, and its implications for explanatory integration
are brieﬂy considered.
1. Introduction. Debates about the unity of the mind-brain sciences have
been reinvigorated in recent years as new accounts of the nature of explanation
in psychology and neuroscience have been introduced into the philosophical
literature. Whereas previous versions of the debate focused on whether psy-
chological theories could be reduced to neuroscientiﬁc theories—a possibility
blocked by the argument for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds
at the neural level (Fodor 1974)—the new debate concerns whether a uniﬁed
science of cognition can be achieved via the integration of psychological and
neuroscientiﬁc explanations.Advocates of mechanistic explanation (Piccinini
and Craver 2011) argue that cognitive psychology is not autonomous from
neuroscience because explanations of cognitive capacities by functional anal-
ysis are simply incomplete mechanistic explanations. Once the structural de-
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tails—the physical entities and activities that realize cognitive capacities—are
“ﬁlled in,” explanations by functional analysis become “full-blownmechanis-
tic explanations” (Piccinini and Craver 2011, 283). As a consequence of suc-
cessful explanatory integration, cognitive psychology and neuroscience will
come to form a uniﬁed science of cognition.
The aim of this paper is to argue that experimental practice in cognitive
psychology and neuroscience is not conducive to the type of explanatory
integration Piccinini and Craver advocate. In section 2, I outline the main
features of the account of explanatory integration they put forward. In sec-
tion 3, I make the case that the integration of functional analyses and mech-
anistic explanations requires that components of the two types of explana-
tion, namely, cognitive capacities, are stable. I deﬁne stability by appeal to
conceptual tools on offer in the theoretical literature in psychology and the
social sciences and identify certain facts about experimental practice in cog-
nitive psychology and neuroscience that have contributed to the instability
of constructs designating cognitive capacities. In section 4, I propose some
changes to experimental practice conducive to stabilizing these constructs
and consider the implications for explanatory integration.
2. A Uniﬁed Science of Cognition. Explanations in neuroscience, insofar
as they describe the physical entities/components and activities/processes
that realize phenomena of interest, have been characterized as mechanistic
(e.g., Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008). Given the complex nature of the kinds
of phenomena mechanistic explanations are intended to explain, their devel-
opment is taken to require input from multiple different laboratories and ar-
eas of neuroscience situated at multiple different levels of analysis. To take
a celebrated example from the philosophical literature on mechanistic expla-
nation, activation of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors in area CA1 of
the rat hippocampus is one component in the description of the multilevel
mechanism of rodent spatial memory. According to Craver, such explana-
tions arise as ﬁndings from many different cellular, molecular, and behav-
ioral neuroscience laboratories are “integrated” into descriptions of multi-
level mechanisms (Craver 2007).
In contrast to mechanistic explanations, explanations in cognitive psy-
chology are “explanations by functional analysis” (e.g., Cummins 1983)
and are used to explain mental functions or processes without regard for an-
atomical, structural, biochemical, or physiological facts about brains. Ac-
cording to Jerry Fodor (1968, 107–8), “the psychologist [seeks] functional
characterizations of psychological constructs,” and “the criteria employed
for individuating such constructs are based primarily on hypotheses about
the role they play in the etiology of behavior.” Cognitive psychologists de-
sign complex tasks in order to tease apart distinct cognitive processes by ap-
peal to subjects’ behavioral performance on those tasks. The resulting expla-
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nations are sometimes depicted by means of box and arrow diagrams where
the boxes stand in for psychological capacities (e.g., working memory) and
the arrows represent the input-output/feed-forward/feed-backward connec-
tions or information ﬂow from stimulus inputs to behavioral outputs. In con-
trast to the mechanistic explanation of spatial memory provided above, an
early explanation of spatial memory by functional analysis described an “‘in-
ternal navigation’ system” that received sensory data and “movement feed-
back” from the motor system and sent information to a “map construction
system” (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978, 94).1
Although cognitive psychology and neuroscience are regarded as distinct
scientiﬁc enterprises, Piccinini and Craver (2011) have recently argued that
the two ﬁelds are not explanatorily autonomous.2 While both areas of sci-
ence aim to explain cognitive capacities like spatial memory, they claim that
only neuroscience is successful insofar as it identiﬁes both the functional and
structural details—the activities and the entities—of the systems that realize
cognitive capacities. Piccinini and Craver may be described as conceiving of
the two forms of explanation as situated at different points on an explanatory
completeness continuum. Functional analyses or “mechanism sketches” lie
at one end; complete mechanistic explanations of cognitive capacities lie at
the other. Once neuroscience ﬁlls in “the structural aspects that are missing
from a functional analysis,” it “turns into a more complete mechanistic ex-
planation” (Piccinini and Craver 2011, 308). To return to our example, “the
cognitive map system,”which was originally a component of an explanation
of spatial behavior by functional analysis, may be described as being later
“ﬁlled in” with a brain structure, namely, the hippocampus (e.g., O’Keefe
and Nadel 1978). At that point, the entities and activities of the hippocam-
pus, namely, place cells in area CA1, became relevant to explaining how
the hippocampus comes to produce a cognitive map. Craver’s (2007) depic-
tion of the mechanism of spatial memory thus may be regarded as an expla-
nation by functional analysis that has since moved further on down the ex-
planatory completeness continuum.3 Such examples at ﬁrst blush appear to
support Piccinini and Craver’s idea that “functional analyses can be seam-
lessly integrated with mechanistic explanations, and psychology can be seam-
lessly integrated with neuroscience” (2011, 308).
1. O’Keefe and Nadel (1978, 89–101) outline the “psychological basis” of cognitive
maps.
2. Craver is amenable to scientists making autonomous decisions to have their mecha-
nistic explanations “bottom out” where they see ﬁt. This does not preclude another in-
vestigator locating the bottom somewhere else.
3. While Piccinini and Craver do not appeal to this example to support their argument, it
instantiates the kinds of features they have in mind.
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In addition to what appear to be successful explanations like that of spa-
tial memory, which support the idea that explanations by functional analysis
andmechanistic explanations are being integrated, Piccinini and Craver’s ar-
gument derives support from methodologically integrative scientiﬁc areas
like neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience, whose very existence may
be taken to suggest that cognitive psychology cannot advance our under-
standing of cognition in the absence of neuroscience. Although many neuro-
psychologists uphold the information processing view of the mind character-
istic of cognitive psychology and use behavioral tasks to decompose cognitive
processes into their component subprocesses, they regard comparing task per-
formance of normal subjects with that of subjects with brain lesions and neu-
rological disorders essential for such functional decomposition. While many
cognitive neuroscientists also endorse an information processing view of the
mind and use behavioral tasks designed to individuate cognitive processes,
they combine these methods with imaging (e.g., functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging), recording (e.g., electroencephalography), and intervention
(e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation) techniques that are intended to facil-
itate the localization of such processes in the brain. These two methodologi-
cally integrative ﬁelds, at least at ﬁrst blush, provide good grounds for think-
ing that Piccinini and Craver are right and explanations of cognitive capacities
by functional analysis alone are insufﬁcient; knowledge about the structural
details of brains that realize those capacities is relevant. However, as I aim to
show in the next section, when we look more closely at these areas of sci-
ence, we realize that they are not currently on a trajectory toward integrating
functional analyses with mechanistic explanations because current practice
both within and across the relevant areas of science is not directed at stabiliz-
ing the meanings of the terms designating cognitive capacities that occur in
the two forms of scientiﬁc explanation.
3. Construct Stabilization as Prerequisite for Integration. Historically,
advocates for unity of science have argued for theory reduction (e.g., Nagel
1961). Although Piccinini and Craver advocate for unity via explanatory in-
tegration, as I will show, at least one of the traditional constraints on inter-
theoretic reduction, connectability, is presupposed by their account. The ba-
sic idea behind the connectability condition is that theories contain terms
that have certain referents, and for two theories to be participants in a suc-
cessful reduction relation, “a bridge law” must be established, which spec-
iﬁes that the referents of the terms in the theory to be reduced are bidirec-
tionally equivalent to the referents of the terms in the reducing theory. The
classic example of successful satisfaction of the connectability condition is
the reduction of the term “temperature of a gas” in thermodynamic theory to
“mean kinetic energy of the molecules” in statistical mechanics.
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The connectability condition applies to explanatory integration insofar as
the explanations that are candidates for integration must have the same ref-
erents. More speciﬁcally, the terms designating cognitive capacities in an ex-
planation by functional analysis must have roughly the same referents as the
terms designating cognitive capacities in a mechanistic explanation. To refer
back to the example in the previous section, an explanation by functional
analysis that contains the term spatial memory ought to refer to the same phe-
nomenon as a mechanistic explanation that contains the term spatial memory.
As Piccinini and Craver claim, whereas explanations by functional analysis
identify capacities and subcapacities,mechanistic explanations identify capac-
ities, subcapacities, and the structural parts of brains and their activities that
realize those capacities. Terms designating cognitive capacities are the com-
mon denominator between the two forms of explanation, and satisfying the
connectability condition requires that the terms designate the same thing. Oth-
erwise, what we have is not explanatory integration, but elimination and re-
placement of terms in one area of science for the other.
My aim in the rest of this section is to demonstrate that a prerequisite for
connectability—construct stability—cannot be met because the terms des-
ignating cognitive capacities in cognitive psychology, and particularly in
neuroscience, do not have stable referents, and experimental practice in
these areas of science currently is not directed at securing such stability.
In order tomakemy case, some conceptual tools for thinking about how cog-
nitive capacities are investigated experimentally and how theoretical con-
structs attain stability in sciences that study cognitive capacities are relevant.
The starting point for my analysis is the individual laboratory. This choice
of starting point is justiﬁed by virtue of the fact that Piccinini and Craver
identify two ways explanatory integration comes about. The ﬁrst is described
above: mechanistic explanations ﬁll in the structural details of explanations
by functional analysis. This kind of integration seems to involve already-
developed and stable functional components of functional analyses and/or
mechanistic explanations being integrated together. However, Piccinini and
Craver also identify another form of explanatory integration that involves
“the integration of ﬁndings from different areas of neuroscience and psychol-
ogy into a description of multilevel mechanisms” (2011, 285). Findings about
cognitive capacities originate in individual laboratories. So, if we are inter-
ested in whether the connectability condition is beingmet, our analysis should
begin with intralab practices for stabilizing constructs designating cognitive
capacities and be extended to interlab practices across laboratories. In putting
forward this set of conceptual tools, I am interested primarily in those features
of experimental practice that those areas of cognitive psychology and neuro-
science that study cognitive capacities have in common, so as to use these
tools as a basis for identifying differences in these features.
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When a cognitive psychologist or neuroscientist goes into the laboratory
to investigate a cognitive capacity, she will have likely grouped together
instances of what she takes to be the same capacity under a concept or con-
struct. She may rely on how other investigators in her ﬁeld deﬁne the con-
cept, but she may also deﬁne it slightly differently. Examples of constructs
that designate cognitive capacities in cognitive psychology and neurosci-
ence include spatial memory, working memory, attention, face recognition,
and procedural memory (to name only a handful). Such constructs originate
with a concept that investigators associate with certain observations, which
serves as a basis for theory building and experimental task/paradigm design
and construction.
Once an investigator has selected a cognitive capacity of interest, which
is designated by a construct, she then develops an experimental paradigm—
a set of procedures for producing, measuring, and detecting an instance of that
capacity in the laboratory. For example, an experimental paradigm used to in-
vestigate a cognitive capacity like spatial memory will include a set of pro-
duction procedures that specify the stimuli (e.g., distal and local cues) to be
presented, how those stimuli are to be presented/arranged (e.g., spatially, tem-
porally), and how many times each stimulus is to be presented during phases
of pre-training, training, and post-training/testing. The paradigm will also in-
clude measurement procedures that specify the response variables to be mea-
sured in pre-training and post-training/testing phases of the experiment and
how to measure them using apparatuses designed for such measurement. Fi-
nally, a set of detection procedures speciﬁes what the comparative measure-
ments of the response variables from the different phases of the experiment
must equal in order to ascribe the cognitive capacity of interest to the organism
and/or the locus of the function to a given brain area or neuronal population.
An investigator will, in the ideal case, aim to design an experimental par-
adigm that produces an instance of the kind of capacity she intends to detect
andmeasure. She ought towant thematch between the effect she produces in
the laboratory and the phenomena she takes to be grouped together under the
general construct to be valid. Another way to put this is that she aims for the
experimental paradigm she selected to have a high degree of “construct va-
lidity.” Construct validity “is involved whenever a test is to be interpreted as
a measure of some attribute or quality which is not operationally deﬁned”
(Cronbach and Meehl 1955, 282). It “involves making inferences from the
sampling particulars of a study to the higher-order constructs they represent”
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002, 65). Experimental paradigms or cogni-
tive tasks may have anywhere from a low to high degree of construct validity.
The higher the degree of construct validity, the closer the match between the
effect under study in the laboratory and the cognitive phenomena designated
by the construct.
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It is important to note that the experimental process within any given lab-
oratory is rarely one-shot. Oftentimes, an investigator and/or his/her critics
wonder whether the investigative procedures she has used in the laboratory
satisfy the criterion of construct validity. Such worries prompt the processes
of “construct explication” and “construct assessment” (Shadish et al. 2002).
These processes may be understood in terms of a series of questions that ide-
ally become a fundamental part of the experimental process. Speciﬁcally, an
investigator asks the following at the relevant stages of this process: (1)Which
instances of worldly phenomena should be grouped together under the con-
cept designating the construct? (2) Which investigative strategies will yield
instances that instantiate it? (3) Are the investigative strategies adequate, or
should they be modiﬁed? (4) Given the data these investigative strategies
yield, should the construct be revised to exclude phenomena that do not be-
long in the category or to include additional phenomena that do?4
Returning to Piccinini and Craver’s account of explanatory integration, it
is important to note that construct stabilization will involve more than a sin-
gle lab and more than a single area of science. In other words, stabilizing
constructs via processes like construct explication and construct assessment
will involve coordination across labs situated in the same and different areas
of science to come to speciﬁc agreement about (1) how to generally deﬁne
terms, (2) what are the best experimental paradigms for studying a given
cognitive capacity, and (3) the conditions under which two experimental par-
adigms can be said to measure the same cognitive capacity. Yet, do we en-
counter such coordination in the form of a consistent emphasis on construct
validation/explication/assessment across laboratories and investigators in
the same and different areas of cognitive psychology and neuroscience?
A proper answer to this question requires investigating the stability of
constructs designating cognitive capacities in the sciences that study cogni-
tion on a case-by-case basis,5 a project that cannot be undertaken in the con-
text of a single paper. Instead, the current approach is to point to facts that
are suggestive that the meaning of constructs designating cognitive capac-
ities is not stable in the sciences studying cognition owing in large part to
the fact that strategies for stabilizing constructs are not consistently adopted
across investigators and research areas.
Let’s begin by considering construct stabilization in cognitive psychol-
ogy. As a long-standing scientiﬁc tradition, one of its paradigmatic features
is to educate its members on the importance of engaging in rigorous task
analyses to determine the component cognitive processes operative in the
production of behavioral data. This should provide us with some conﬁdence
4. Adapted from Shadish et al. (2002, 66).
5. Piccinini and Craver do not provide an example of a psychological explanation by
functional analysis successfully integrated with a mechanistic explanation.
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that intralab strategies are in place to stabilize constructs designating cog-
nitive capacities. This does not mean, however, that interlab practices are
conducive to stability. For example, two investigators may be interested in
studying spatial memory in the rodent but disagree about the most suitable
task for this purpose. One investigator may use the Morris water maze, and
another, the elevated T-maze. Yet, stimuli and task demands differ radically
between these two tasks, and it is difﬁcult to tease apart the component cog-
nitive processes involved in each.6 Investigators also often disagree about
which component cognitive processes are involved in the production of a
given set of behavioral data, and often the behavioral data are compatible with
multiple different explanations by functional analysis.
Piccinini and Craver might respond that the way to overcome such under-
determination is by investigating the brain structures that realize the cogni-
tive processes in question. This is because, as they claim, structure places con-
straints on function; structure determines the kinds of cognitive processes that
can be realized and how. It is at this point that they advocate a move to cog-
nitive neuroscience and toward explanatory integration. Yet, there are certain
challenges that this move faces. One concerns the limitations of the method
of reverse inference (e.g., Poldrack 2006). A second problem, with which I
am concerned here, is that successful explanatory integration requires, at a
bare minimum, that the constructs designating cognitive capacities are stable
and thus connectable between the two areas of science.
There are good reasons, however, to think that this is not the case. First,
cognitive neuroscientists do not agree among themselves about whether
achieving construct validity and engaging in construct explication or construct
assessment are important. Some investigators do aim to identify the compo-
nent cognitive processes thought to be engaged in experimental tasks and
determine how the variables manipulated in an experiment affect these pro-
cesses (see Sullivan 2014a, 2014b). However, Russell Poldrack suggests that
many cognitive neuroscientists rarely engage in such task analysis at all: “Un-
fortunately, . . . task analyses are very rarely presented in neuroimaging pa-
pers. Whereas formal theories from cognitive psychology could often pro-
vide substantial guidance in the design of such tasks, it is uncommon for
neuroimaging studies to takemeaningful guidance from such theories. Rather,
the task comparisons in many studies are based on intuitive judgments re-
garding the cognitive processes engaged by a particular task” (2010, 149).
In other words, task analysis, which is a component of construct explication
and assessment, is not something that currently occurs across laboratories or
investigators in a consistent, coordinated way.
6. For example, Morris’s “key message” in a recent book chapter on the water maze is
that it “is not just one task, but a family of procedures suited to diverse scientiﬁc ques-
tions” (2015, 73).
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Another factor contributing to construct instability in cognitive neuro-
science is the far-reaching methodological pluralism. If we look across labs
in cognitive neuroscience and do a comparative analysis, we encounter “a
multiplicity of experimental protocols” (Sullivan 2009) insofar as investiga-
tors often do not agree on which experimental paradigms ought to be used
to investigate a given cognitive capacity, and they have freedom to design
tasks as they deem most appropriate to their explanatory goals. Carrie Fig-
dor (2011) puts the point nicely in claiming that the terms used to designate
kinds of cognitive capacities do not have stable meanings; even if different
investigators use the same term to refer to a kind of cognitive function or a
kind of experiment, it does not mean that they intended to designate the
“same” cognitive function bymeans of the term. Investigators may also look
at the very same task and yet disagree about the component processes in-
volved given either, as Poldrack claims, their intuitive judgments or prior
theoretical commitments.
Cognitive neuroscientists, like Poldrack, acknowledge thewidespread con-
struct instability in cognitive neuroscience (and lack of a proper cognitive on-
tology) and have offered solutions that have yet to be broadly implemented
in practice. Some claim that to localize cognitive functions we need a coordi-
nated effort to develop a taxonomy ofmore general constructs (e.g., “sensory-
motor integration”) that are more suitable for capturing what particular brain
areas do (Price and Friston 2005). Others claim that we need coordinated ef-
forts to develop “process pure” tasks that individuate ﬁner-grained constructs
than those on offer in cognitive psychology (see Sullivan 2014b). In addition
to Poldrack’s suggestions to develop cognitive tasksmore appropriate to func-
tional localization (2006) and to engage inmore rigorous task analysis (2010),
he advocates the use of meta-analyses and data-mining techniques as a basis
for assessing the strength of hypotheses about what functions speciﬁc brain
areas are performing (2006).
These facts, taken in combination, provide grounds for doubting that the
constructs designating cognitive capacities in cognitive neuroscience are
stable in the way required for Piccinini and Craver’s explanatory integra-
tion. Further, while various investigators working in cognitive neuroscience
have begun to acknowledge the problem and to itemize its sources, there
currently is no agreed-on panacea. Part of the problem is that cognitive neu-
roscience, insofar as it is integrative, is eclectic. Investigators do not neces-
sarily share a Kuhnian paradigm in common. However, one important
theme that arises is the continued importance of the perspective and meth-
ods of cognitive psychology for individuating cognitive capacities and sta-
bilizing constructs in cognitive neuroscience. This suggests that what is
needed in integrative areas of neuroscience is the preservation of a plurality
of perspectives, as well as the promotion of perspectives likely to aid in the
achievement of integrative explanatory goals. Establishing that perspectival
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pluralism speciﬁcally is necessary for explanatory integration is the aim of
the next section.
4. Perspectival Pluralism and Explanatory Integration. Cognitive psy-
chologists and cognitive neuroscientists adopt different ontological per-
spectives on cognitive systems insofar as they appeal to different “set[s] of
variables . . . to characterize” and “partition” those “systems . . . into parts”;
these perspectives directly inform how these investigators “interact causally
with [those] system[s]” (Wimsatt 2007, 227) and impact how they design
their experiments (see also Giere 2010). For example, when Richard Morris
designed the water maze, he was interested in the construct “place learn-
ing”—the cognitive ability to ﬁnd a hidden target in the absence of local
cues. He adopted an information processing view of the mind, and this inti-
mately shaped the experimental design of the water maze (see Sullivan 2010).
Data from his experiments originally led him to conclude that the water maze
individuated place learning.
However, a separate and later research study (Eichenbaum, Stewart, and
Morris 1990) revealed that rats with hippocampal lesions—the structure
thought to underlie place learning—could still perform successfully in the
water maze. These results, which were obtained when investigators adopted
an information processing view of the brain and its structures, suggested,
contrary to Morris’s ﬁndings, that the water maze does not individuate a dis-
crete cognitive capacity. Rather, other cognitive processes (e.g., nonspatial,
associative) are involved.
In contrast, cognitive neurobiologists, who use the water maze to study
cellular and molecular activity, are not concerned with these constituent in-
formation processes. Their failure to recognize that the water maze involves
multiple distinct cognitive processes has likely contributed to the instability
of the construct used to designate the phenomenon under study in the water
maze (see Sullivan 2010). It has also resulted in mechanistic explanations
that lack clear explananda, like the claim that NMDA-receptor activation
in the hippocampus is a necessary component of the mechanism of “spatial
memory.”As evidence in support of this point, investigators with training in
cognitive psychology working in collaboration with Morris raised the ques-
tion why rats with blocked NMDA receptors fail to perform successfully in
the water maze. They employed a battery of cognitive tests designed to iden-
tify “what” informational processes are disrupted byNMDA-receptor block-
ade and “what” information rats actually learn in the water maze. In taking
this information processing perspective, they demonstrated that NMDA-
receptor activation likely “disrupts non-spatial as well as spatial components
of water maze learning” (Bannerman et al. 1995, 185).
The water maze illustrates nicely that stabilizing constructs designat-
ing cognitive capacities is an iterative process that requires multiple distinct
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perspectives to be operative when experimental paradigms are being de-
signed and implemented in the lab and the resulting data are being interpreted.
Further, it shows that ensuring stabilization of constructs used to designate
cognitive capacities requires that investigators engage in the process of con-
struct explication. In other words, cognitive psychology does not have a time-
limited role to play in explanatory integration; its involvement should be on-
going.
That perspectival pluralism of the form I am advocating is essential for
explanatory integration also derives support from two recent initiatives spear-
headed by the National Institutes ofMental Health: the Research Domain Cri-
teria (RDoC) project and the Cognitive Neuroscience Treatment Research to
ImproveCognition in Schizophrenia (CNTRICS) initiative. Investigatorswho
are involved in these interdisciplinary initiatives include cognitive psychol-
ogists, cognitive neuroscientists, experts in animal behavior, cognitive neuro-
biologists, clinical pharmacologists, and members of industry. They all share
in common the aim of developing experimental paradigms to identify the cog-
nitive and behavioral capacities that are disrupted in persons with mental
illnesses, so that treatments for these dysfunctions may be identiﬁed. They
believe that this aim can only be achieved if the different perspectives they rep-
resent each play a role in the design, implementation, and revision of exper-
imental paradigms (Sullivan 2014b).
5. Conclusion. Explanatory integration requires stable explanatory targets,
stable constructs. We do not have such stability in the neurosciences of cog-
nition. Perspectival pluralism of the form advocated here might be a viable
means of achieving it. Indeed, recent initiatives in mental health research em-
phasize the importance of perspectival pluralism for explanatory integration.
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